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in Kyles, the Court sent a strong message to prosecutors that they have a
duty to err on the side of disclosure.49 Kyles' broad reprimand to the
prosecution provides wonderful language to support defense requests for
49 The Court supports the notion that prosecutors in doubt should
lean toward disclosure by citing to United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at
108, and justifies that burden by claiming that it is the only way to create
an equitable balance at trial. Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1568.
disclosure. The Court's eager appropriation of the Fifth Circuit dissent
should also inspire defense attorneys; capturing the attention of one
judge, even in dissent, can be an essential tool in later obtaining a new
trial for your client.
Summary and analysis by:
Courtney S. Townes
TUGGLE v. NETHERLAND
1995 WL 630932 (U.S.)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Lem Davis Tuggle was convicted in 1984 of capital murder com-
mitted during or subsequent to the rape of Ms. Jessie Geneva Havens. 1
He was sentenced to death after the jury found the Commonwealth had
proven both future dangerousness and vileness. 2 The Supreme Court of
Virginia affirmed the conviction and sentence. 3 In 1985, the United
States Supreme Court vacated his sentence and remanded the case to the
Supreme Court of Virginia for reconsideration in light of Ake v. Okla-
homa 4 Ake held that when the prosecution presents psychiatric evidence
of the defendant's future dangerousness at the sentencing phase, due
process requires that the defendant be provided an independent psychia-
trist to assist in the defense.
5
On remand, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court
had indeed violated Ake (Tuggle II) by denying Tuggle an independent
psychiatrist to rebut the prosecution's psychiatric evidence as to future
dangerousness during the sentencing phase.6 Nonetheless, the Court
upheld Tuggle's conviction and sentence, concluding that because the
vileness factor was separately found by the jury in addition to future
dangerousness, the vileness factor alone was sufficient to sustain the
sentence under Virginia law.
7
Tuggle again petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court; this time he was denied.8 A subsequent petition for state habeas
relief was denied, as was his third petition for certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court.9 Tuggle then petitioned for federal habeas relief
to the District Court for the Western District of Virginia, raising ten
allegations.
The district court granted relief. The court found, inter alia, that (1)
the Supreme Court of Virginia had erred in upholding Tuggle's death
I Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(5) (Supp. 1995).
2 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2 (1995).
3 Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 493, 323 S.E.2d 539 (1984)
(Tuggle 1).
4470 U.S. 68 (1985).
5 Id. at 83.
6 Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 99, 334 S.E.2d 838 (1985)
(Tuggle II).
7 Id. at 108-11, 334 S.E.2d at 844-46.
8 Tuggle v. Virginia, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986).
9 Tuggle v. Bair, 503 U.S. 989 (1992).
10 Tuggle v. Thompson, 57 F.3d 1356, 1361 (4th Cir. 1995).
11 Id.
sentence after striking future dangerousness as an aggravating circum-
stance and (2) the vileness instruction was unconstitutionally vague.10
As a result, the court vacated the sentence and ordered that Tuggle be
retried within six months.11 The Commonwealth appealed.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court. It found that the
United States Supreme Court's ruling in Zant v. Stephens12 allowed
Tuggle's sentence to stand upon a finding of vileness after future
dangerousness had been thrown out under Ake. 13 It agreed with the
Supreme Court of Virginia that under Zant v. Stephens, theAke error did
not invalidate the jury's finding of vileness.14 Hence, it concluded that
the vileness finding was sufficient to support Tuggle's death sentence
and.reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief on this ground.
15
Tuggle again petitioned to the United States Supreme Court. The
Court granted certiorari and reversed the Fourth Circuit.
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court ruled that the Fourth Circuit had
misinterpretedZant v. Stephens. The Court explained that whileZant did
hold that the invalidation of one aggravating circumstance "does not
necessarily require setting aside a death penalty, ' 16 Zant does not
support the proposition that "the existence of a valid aggravator always
excuses a constitutional error in the admission or exclusion of evi-
dence." 17 Where ajury has heard "materially inaccurate evidence,"Zant
does not apply to support a death sentence. 18 Because the jury in
Tuggle's case had heard inadmissible evidence which could have af-
fected their ultimate decision to impose death, the Court vacated the
Fourth Circuit'sjudgment. 19 The Courtremanded to the lowercourts for
consideration of whether a harmless-error analysis were applicable.
20
12462 U.S. 862 (1983).
13 Tuggle, 57 F.3d at 1374.
14 Id.
15 Id. For the Foruth Circuit's analysis in reversing the district
court's finding that the vileness instruction was too vague, see case
summary of Tuggle v. Thompson, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
16 Tuggle v. Netherland, No. 95-6016,1995 WL 63 0932, at *2 (U.S.
Oct. 30, 1995) (per curiam) (emphasis in the original).
17Id.
18 Id. The court cited the holding of Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S.
578 (1988) for this proposition.
19 Id.
20 Id.
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ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. The Supreme Court Struck Down the Fourth Circuit's Holding
thatThe vileness AggravatorWas SufficienttoUphold Tuggle's
Death Sentence
A. Zant v. Stephens
In Zant, the United States Supreme Court decided whether a death
sentence must be vacated because one of three statutory aggravating
circumstances found by the jury was later held to be invalid by the
Supreme Court of Georgia. 21 The jury had found three aggravating
circumstances justifying Stephens' death penalty, specifically that the
murder had been committed by a person who (1) had a prior record of a
capital felony, (2) had a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal
convictions, and (3) had escaped from the lawful custody of a peace
officer and a lawful place of confinement. 22 While Stephens' appeal was
pending, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that the "substantial
history" aggravating circumstance was unconstitutional because it was
too vague. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Georgia found that
Stephens' death sentence could still stand because the other two aggra-
vating factors were valid and were sufficient to support the sentence.23
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Supreme Court of
Georgia. 24 The Court explained that Georgia law governing admissibil-
ity showed that the evidence relied upon to prove the previous convic-
tions was "properly adduced... and was fully subject to explanation by
the defendant."25 This evidence would have been admitted even without
the invalid aggravating circumstance; moreover, its accuracy went
unchallenged. Hence, its admission did not raise the problem of whether
the verdict was reliable, for while the aggravating circumstance had been
struck down for vagueness, the underlying evidence was sound and the
jury still had made its ultimate decision on evidence properly before it.
26
Therefore, when one aggravator is later found invalid, sustaining a death
sentence requires determining why the factor was invalid. If its invalidity
was because the jury considered inaccurate evidence, such an error will
demand vacation of the death penalty despite the fact that a valid
aggravating circumstance remains.
B. The Fourth Circuit's Logic: Upholding Tuggle's death sen-
tence under Zant v. Stephens
In its opinion, the Fourth Circuit had agreed with the Supreme Court
of Virginia thatZant stands for theproposition that' [w]hen ajury makes
separate findings of specific statutory aggravating circumstances, any of
which could support a sentence of death, and one of the circumstances
subsequently is invalidated, the remaining valid circumstance, or cir-
cumstances, will support the sentence."' 27
21Zant, 462 U.S. at 864.
22 Id. at 866-67.
23 Id. at 867-68.
24 1d. at 890.
25 Id. at 887.
26Id.
27 Tuggle, 57 F.3d at 1363. (quoting Tuggle II, 230 Va. at 110, 334
S.E.2d at 845).
28 Id. at 1362.
29 Id.
30 1d.
3 11d. at 1363-64. In its analysis, the Fourth Circuit found it signifi-
cant that Tuggle's second request for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court had been denied when his brief included the argu-
ment that the Supreme Court of Virginia had misinterpreted Zant. 57
F.3d at 1362. Specifically, Tuggle queried whether Zant v. Stephens
The Fourth Circuit believed thatZant required drawing a distinction
between "weighing" and "non-weighing" states, which the federal
district court had failed to do.28 The Fourth Circuit explained that in
"weighing" states, the jury is specifically instructed to weigh only the
statutory aggravating factors against mitigating factors, while in "non-
weighing" states, the function of the aggravating factors is only to narrow
the category of death eligible persons.29 The court noted that Virginia is
a non-weighing state because its statutory aggravating factors function
only to narrow the category of death, and the Commonwealth is free to
argue other aggravating evidence to the jury.30 The Fourth Circuit then
strung together a series of quotations to uphold the Supreme Court of
Virginia's interpretation of Zant as applied in a non-weighing state.
According to the Supreme Court of Virginia and the Fourth Circuit, Zant
means that in a non-weighing state so long as there is one valid
aggravating circumstance, the death sentence may stand even if other
aggravating circumstances were invalid.
31
C. Tuggle v. Netherland: Zant v. Stephens Required the Vaca-
tion of Tuggle's Death Sentence
In Tuggle v. Netherland, the Supreme Court explained that the
Fourth Circuit's logic was clearly a misinterpretation of Zant.32 The
Supreme Court contrasted Zant to Tuggle's case. The Court stressed that
inZant there hadbeen no claim that inadmissible evidence was before the
jury during its deliberations or that the defendant had been precluded
from adducing relevant mitigating evidence.33 However, in Tuggle's
case, because of the Ake violation, the Commonwealth's evidence as to
his future dangerousness was not properlybefore thejury.TheAke error,
explained the Court, prevented Tuggle from rebutting the
Commonwealth's psychiatric evidence and from enhancing his defense
in mitigation.34 Because the psychiatric evidence went unchallenged, its
persuasiveness could have been "unfairly increased.., in the eyes of the
jury. '35 Accordingly, the lack of this evidence may have affected the
jury's "ultimate decision, based on all of the evidence before it," to
impose the death penalty.
36
The Court then clarified the holding of Zant. The Court held that
while Zant does hold that the "invalidation of one aggravator does not
necessarily require that a death sentence be set aside,"'37 Zant does not
hold that "the existence of a valid aggravator always excuses a constitu-
tional error in the admission or exclusion of evidence" (the different
proposition under which the Fourth Circuit had affirmed Tuggle's death
sentence).38 Instead, Johnson v. Mississippi39 set down the applicable
rule for the circumstances in Tuggle. In that case, the Court held that Zant
did not apply to support a death sentence where the jury had considered
"materially inaccurate evidence." 40 Hence, becauseAke error had caused
the sentencing jury in Tuggle to consider inaccurate evidence, the Fourth
was"' me ant to serve as wholesale invitation to appellate courts to ignore
constitutional infirmities in the sentencing phase of a capital trial, so long
as more than one aggravating circumstance is found. [Because] that it
[sic] is how the decision is being applied in Virginia."'Id. This argument
is flawed, however, because a denial of certiorari is never considered to
be an affirmation of a lower court's holding. Maryland v. Baltimore
Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950).







39486 U.S. 578 (1988).
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Circuit had erred in holding thatZantsupported Tuggle's death sentence.
The Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's judgment on this basis.4 1
Concurring, Justice Scalia contended that the case should have been
subject to harmless-error analysis appropriate to collateral review.42 He
asserted that Tuggle's case did not concern the effects of finding an
"invalid aggravating circumstance" but rather was a "straightforward
inadmissible-evidence case." 43 In contrast, the per curiam opinion,
while remanding for consideration of whether harmless-error analysis
was appropriate, left the issue open. Nonetheless the issues that arise
from theAke violation show that its ramifications require more than just
a harmless-error analysis.
II. Additional Due Process Concerns Emanating from the Ake
Error
Not only was the Commonwealth's psychiatric evidence intro-
duced at Tuggle's trial error because it was inadmissible under Ake
(Justice Scalia's argument in concurring), it also was barred by other
principles of due process. By allowing the Commonwealth to intro-
duce the psychiatric evidence, and yet denying the defendant his
right to a psychiatrist under Ake, the defendant (as the Supreme
Court stressed) was not given a meaningful opportunity to rebut the
Commonwealth's evidence. The jury thus not only heard 'bad
evidence' they should not have, they also never heard the 'good
evidence' which Tuggle had a constitutional right to introduce in
rebuttal. Due process, therefore, was violated because Tuggle was
sentenced to death "on the basis of information which he had no
opportunity to deny or explain."'44
This basic principle of due process was recently reaffirmed by the
United States Supreme CourtinSkipperv. South Carolina45 and Simmons
v. South Carolina.46 In Skipper, the prosecution had relied on a predic-
tion of future dangerousness in asking for the death penalty. The trial
court had earlier excluded the testimony of two jailers and a regular
visitor to the jail who would have stated that the defendant had adjusted
well to prison life during the seven and one-half months he was awaiting
trial.47 The Supreme Court held that the trial court's ruling not only
denied the defendant a constitutional right to put on all relevant mitigat-
ing evidence, it also denied him a due process right to rebut the
prosecution on this point.
48
Similarly in Simmons, the prosecution had in part argued future
dangerousness to society in asking for the death penalty. 49 The
defendant rebutted this argument with evidence that because of his
particular psychological problems, he posed a future threat only to
elderly women and as a result, he would not pose a danger in a prison
setting.50 To bolster this argument, the defendant also asked for a
jury instruction which explained that life imprisonment carried no
possibility of parole. 5 1 The trial court refused to give this instruc-
tion.5 2 The United States Supreme Court held that the defendant was
denied due process because he "was prevented from rebutting
information that the sentencing authority considered, and upon
which it may have relied, in imposing the sentence of death."
53
40 Tuggle, 1995 WL 630932 at *2
4 11d.
42 Id. at *3.
43Id.
44 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977).
45 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
46 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
47 Skipper, 476 U.S. at 3.
48 Id. at 5 n.l.
49 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2190.
50 1d. at 2191.
By denying Tuggle his constitutional right to a psychiatrist under
Ake, he was placed precisely in the same position as Skipper and
Simmons. Tuggle never had the opportunity to rebut a critical part of the
prosecution's case. And even though the Supreme Court of Virginia later
threw "future dangerousness" out of his case, that did not change the fact
that the jury had relied directly upon it. Thus, his death sentence should
have been vacated as a denial of due process on this ground.
Once the critical nature of the Ake violation is understood, it can be
seen how the Fourth Circuit ignored the mostbasic lesson taught byZant,
Skipper, and Simmons. This principle is that the jury's decision must be
reliable and that this reliability comes from a sentencing process that is
sound in its entirety. In Zant, the Court specifically noted that had the
prosecution introduced aggravating evidence which should have been
barred because it was based on improper considerations such as race or
mental illness, the whole sentencing process would be tainted and as a
result would require vacating the death sentence.54 This same principle
was central in the Court's decisions to reverse inSkipperand in Simmons.
In Skipper, the Court stated:
[I]t appears reasonably likely that the exclusion of evidence
bearing upon [defendant's] behavior in jail (and hence, upon
his likely future behavior in prison) may have affected the
jury's decision to impose the death sentence. Thus, under any
standard, the exclusion of the evidence was sufficiently preju-
dicial to constitute reversible error.55
The Court was clearly concerned with any potential impairment to the
integrity of thejury's overall decision to impose death. It was enough for
the Court that the evidence may have affected the ultimate decision; the
Court vacated the death sentence on this ground.
Similarly in Simmons, the Court was concerned that a false impres-
sion was left upon the jury in making its final decision. Because the jury
had not been told that life imprisonment meant no parole, their imposi-
tion of the death penalty could have rested upon a misunderstanding of
their choices.56 They could have reasonably believed that the defendant
would eventually be released into society and voted for death in light of
this misunderstanding. 57 The Court held that leaving the jury with this
misperception was a denial of due process and vacated the death
sentence.58
Thus, in Skipper and Simmons, the jury was left with an incomplete
or misleading picture caused by the exclusion of evidence. The Court
ruled in both cases that this exclusion rendered the process itself unsound
because its effect upon the jury's final decision to impose death was
indeterminable. The Court made the same point in Zant, explaining that
where the jury has been presented with improper considerations, (or, as
in Skipper and Simmons, false impressions) due process requires that the
death sentence be vacated because the sentencing proceeding is funda-
mentally flawed.59 These same reasons argue against harmless-error
analysis for Ake error, because, as the per curiam opinion in Tuggle v.
Netherland noted, "the absence of [psychiatric] evidence may well have
affected the jury's ultimate decision ..."60 This distinction is critical to
51Id.
521d. at 2192.
5 3 Id. at 2194.
54 Zant, 462 U.S. at 885.
55 Skipper, 476 U.S. at 8.
56 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2193.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Zant, 462 U.S. at 885.
60 1995 WL 630932 at *2.
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Tug gle's case because as in Simmons and Skipper, the uncertainty as to
how the jury relied upon the Commonwealth's tainted, unrebutted
evidence renders the process itself so unreliable and unsound that
Tuggle's death penalty should be vacated. Any effort to engage in
harmless-error analysis would only be an exercise in speculation about
the results of a fundamentally flawed sentencing hearing. This funda-
mental flaw requires that Tuggle's death penalty be vacated despite the
jury's separate finding of vileness.
TUGGLE V. THOMPSON
Summary and analysis by:
Mary E. Eade
57 F.3d 1356 (4th Cir. 1995)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Lem Davis Tuggle was convicted of capital murder committed
during or subsequent to the rape of Ms. Jessie Geneva Havens. 1 After
being denied certiorari three times by the United States Supreme Court
and after being denied state habeas relief, Tuggle petitioned for federal
habeas relief to the District Court for the Western District of Virginia,
raising ten allegations.
The district court granted relief. The court found, inter alia, that the
vileness instruction was unconstitutionally vague.2 As a result, the court
vacated the sentence and ordered that Tuggle be retried within six
months.3 The Commonwealth appealed.
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court. As to the adequacy of
the vileness instruction, the court concluded that it met the constitutional




Tuggle challenged the adequacy of the vileness instruction,
arguing that it was unconstitutionally vague. 6 What was particularly
troublesome about the actual instruction was that it had omitted the
words "qualitatively and quantitatively" from the traditional in-
struction (itself arguably vague) employed by Virginia courts to
avoid having the vileness instruction struck down as too vague.
7
Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit found that the instruction was not so
vague as to violate Godfrey v. Georgia.
8
1 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(5) (Supp. 1995). The full facts of this
case are described in the case summary of Tuggle v. Netherland, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
2 Tuggle v. Thompson, 57 F.3d 1356, 1359, 1361 (4th Cir. 1995).
This case note will address only the issue concerning the sufficiency of
the vileness instruction. See the case summary of Tuggle v. Netherland,
Capital Defense Digest, this issue fora discussion of the Fourth Circuit's
error in upholding the death sentence after future dangerousness had
been thrown out.
3 1d. at 1359.
4446 U.S. 420 (1980).
5 Tuggle, 57 F.3d at 1374. The court also ruled on a number of other
issues that will not be addressed in this article. The rulings included
findings that (1) pretrial publicity did not require a change of venue; (2)
any error in denying the right to challenge potential jurors outside the
panel's presence was harmless; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to
support a finding of rape under Virginia law. This third holding was
significant to the court's reversal of the district court's grant of relief,
which had found that the Commonwealth had not established a prima
To justify this finding, the Fourth Circuit distorted the reasoning of
Lowenfield v. Phelps.9 Lowenfield simply held that the purpose of
aggravating circumstances is to narrow the class of persons eligible for
the death penalty and that as long as this narrowing occurs at some point
in the proceedings, the constitutional mandate is met. From this basic
holding, the Fourth Circuit extrapolated the conclusion that "[s]ince
under Virginia law the 'narrowing' is accomplished at both the guilt and
sentencing stage, a defendant is given double protection and more than
the Constitution requires." 10 The Fourth Circuit then erroneously sug-
gested, in dicta, that because two narrowings occur in a Virginia capital
trial, the constitutionwouldbe satisfied even where one of the narrowings
is later found to be unconstitutionally vague.11
Lowenfield does hold that the constitution is satisfied so long as the
narrowing of the class of murderers eligible to receive the death penalty
occurs at some point in the proceedings, whether it be at the guilt or
sentencing phase.12 But to the extent the Fourth Circuit was suggesting
that because in Virginia some narrowing occurs at the guilt phase, any
further narrowing need not be subject to vagueness analysis, it clearly
was wrong.
Lowenfield merely held that the Louisiana capital murder statutory
scheme was constitutional in that it satisfactorily narrowed the class of
death-eligible murderers. 13 Lowenfield had argued that because the
statutory aggravating circumstance which the sentencer had found
merely duplicated an element of the underlying offense of murder, the
death sentence should be void. 14 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding
that because Louisiana's definition of capital murder itself met constitu-
tional requirements of adequately narrowing who was death eligible, no
further narrowing need occur at the penalty phase.15
But Lowenfield most certainly did not say that if further narrowing
factors are used, those factors are then exempt from a requirement that
facie case of rape because the evidence was insufficient to find penetra-
tion. Id. at 1367-70.
6 1d. at 1372-73.
7 Id. at 1373. Virginia's statutory vileness factor is identical to the
factor struck down as unconstitutionally vague in Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420 (1980). Consequently, Virginia has employed an instruc-
tion that purports to solve the vagueness problem. The instruction usually
given comes fromSmithv. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455,248 S.E.2d 135
(1978). It defines aggravated battery as, "Battery which, qualitatively
and quantitatively, is more culpable than the minimum necessary to
accomplish an act of murder." Id. at 478, 248 S.E.2d at 149.
8 Tuggle, 57 F.3d at 1372.
9 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
10 Tuggle, 57 F.3d. at 1374.
11 Id. at 1373-74.
12 Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 241-46.
13 Id. at 244-46.
14 Id. at 241.
15 Id. at 246.
